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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW
The Montana Army National Guard (MT ARNG) has recently 
undergone a major reorganization of its structure, person­
nel and equipment resource base, and assigned wartime 
mission. The most fundamental change is the wartime 
mission. The MT ARNG is now structured primarily as a 
frontline combat force, designated as the 163d Armored 
Brigade (163d AR BDE). This status has necessitated a 
complete acquisition and deployment of new and upgraded 
weapons systems and the concurrent training needed to 
insure soldier proficiency in the corresponding military 
occupational specialties. Approximately 900 newly author­
ized positions have accompanied the reorganization, which 
has increased the authorized troop strength of the MT 
ARNG to 3,813 soldiers. (See Appendix A for the MT ARNG 
organizational structure.)
While the reorganization into an Armored Brigade 
structure carries with it the equipment, training and 
personnel needs as identified above, there is a basic and 
compelling change which must be understood and emphasized 
The 163d AR BDE is now designated as frontline. If or
when a conflict occurs which, in accordance which existing 
"war plans", requires the Federal activation of the 163d 
AR BDE, it will be deployed not only to the location of 
the conflict, but in all likelihood, into the very heart 
of the hostilities.
The 163d AR BDE is a self-sufficient, frontline combat 
force. Its assets include organic medical, maintenance, 
engineer, transportation, administrative and food service 
resources which support the combat elements consisting of 
artillery, mechanized infantry (with armored personnel 
carriers) and armor (tanks). The primary weapon system is 
the Ml Abrams main battle tank, with 116 of them author­
ized between the two cavalry (CAV) battalions (see 
Appendix A).
The wartime mission and existence of the 163d AR BDE is 
based upon the application of armor technology and 
tactics. Classified military war plans position the 163d 
in historically one of the most volatile areas of Eurasia 
with a placement time sequence which will maximize deadly 
confrontation. This is particularly sobering since the 
163d AR BDE is a Reserve Component force. The soldiers do 
not prepare for this level of intensity of conflict on a 
full-time basis as does the Active Component, nor are the 
resources available to the MT ARNG units as they are to 
their active duty counterparts. Yet the 163d AR BDE will 
ultimately be assigned to the "front", where the combat is
most Intense and casualties the highest.
The MT ARNG command structure has a most critical and 
ominous responsibility. That responsibility is to 
optimally prepare soldiers for conflict on the 21st 
Century's version of a battlefield. Strategy and 
execution of combat plans and initiatives are dependent 
upon an incredibly complex integration of air and ground 
forces. The "state-of-the-art" technology in weapons, 
communication and information systems is ever more 
dependent upon the capabilities of the human resource, 
whose survival is determined by far too many circumstances 
beyond the individual soldier's control.
The optimal preparation of soldiers for combat can be 
boiled down into the fundamental concept of "training". 
Soldiers and entire organizations must be trained in the 
usage of their equipment and in performing tactical 
operations in a combat and noncombat context. For Army 
National Guard units, this is typically accomplished 
during a weekend "drill" called Inactive Duty Training 
(IDT), held once a month. Once a year, usually for a 
two-week period called Annual Training, this training on 
equipment and tactics is integrated at a training site 
where the unit applies its cumulative year of training 
into actual operations in a field environment. It is 
readily discernible that MT ARNG unit training is severely
hampered by time restrictions. One weekend a month and 
two additional weeks per year do not allow much time to 
train for the combat scenario previously described.
Although it may be desirable that more time be available 
to the MT ARNG for training activities, considering the 
demands of the combat environment, there is little 
latitude for change from the current system. Drilling one 
weekend a month is acceptable to most employers and 
families, however, any more than that may not be so 
acceptable. This leaves only the Annual Training period 
with viable potential for training enhancement. Policies 
exist whereby armor units can conceivably increase the 
length of Annual Training from two to three weeks.
However, soldiers* employment, education and/or family 
commitments are not conducive for such an extension.
Since any alteration of the time available is not 
practical, other options must be considered. A viable and 
realistic option is to change where the Annual Training 
would be held. There are training sites that may be more 
conducive to maximizing the quality and quantity of the 
training experience to both soldier and organization 
alike. The most significant characteristics of an 
"optimal** training site for the MT ARNG include :
1. The training site should be large enough to 
allow all organic units of the 163d AR BDE to train 
concurrently. This would optimize the capability of the
organizational structure to maximally function in a 
coordinated, efficient and effective manner.
2. The training site should have topography 
representative of that to which the 163d AR BDE would be 
deployed, in accordance with the existing war plans.
3. The training site should be relatively close to 
the home location of the units which comprise the 163d AR 
BDE. Travel time to and from the training site directly 
affects the amount of training time which can be devoted 
to weapons and tactics.
4. The training site should have the capability to 
incorporate other military organizations into the training 
environment, i.e. "combined arms". Such organizations 
might include the Air Force and specific Army units, e.g., 
Special Forces (Rangers, paratroopers), communications, 
aviation, etc.. This would provide a realistic battle­
field context because of the aforementioned need for 
coordination of ground and air resources in the integrated 
tactics of battle plans.
5. The training site should be responsive to the 
needs of the units to be trained, specifically in respect 
to the time-frame of the training. This would be 
optimized by State of Montana control over the training 
site, rather than control by the Department of Defense, 
Department of the Army or National Guard Bureau.
6. The training site should be economically sound. 
The State of Montana can, at best, ill afford an 
unanticipated outlay of money for training site develop­
ment and the United States Department of Defense is 
looking at ways to trim its budget. Therefore, training 
site development and maintenance must be cost effective 
relative to the perceived benefits, i.e., training 
enhancement, national security, economic impact.
7. The training site should either have a minimal 
impact on the site's environment and/or the environment 
itself should be essentially uninhabited, unproductive 
and/or unusable for other commercial or personal uses 
inconsistent with the training activity.
Historically, the 163d AR BDE has held its Annual 
Training activities at Gowen Field, Idaho, located twelve 
miles south of Boise. Currently, the Montana National 
Guard is actively pursuing the acquisition of Federal, 
state, county and private lands and facilities in Valley 
County to develop what would be called the Montana 
Training Center (MTC). If developed, practically all MT 
ARNG training currently held and resources located at 
Gowen Field (and other locations) would be transferred to 
the MTC. The resultant impacts are very significant in 
military, economic, environmental and social perspectives
This paper is a preliminary study of the feasibility 
of developing the Montana Training Center, a major
training area planned and designed for a wide spectrum of 
ground and air training activities. To be sure, the 
proposed size and activities of the MTC raise many 
pressing issues. In the course of this study, the most 
significant of these issues will be researched and 
presented. It must be noted that this professional paper 
contains information which is considered For Official Use 
Only (FOUO)• This status does not constitute a security 
classification, (i.e.. Confidential, Secret, etc.) and no 
material in this paper will compromise classified 
documentation or information. However, an FOUO status does 
necessitate controlled access to this report. Only those 
individuals who have a "need to know" should have said 
access. Issues to be researched and presented include:
1. The actual need of such a training site. In a 
context of disarmament, weapons and troop reductions, the 
need of the Montana Training Center is debatable.
2. The advantages and disadvantages of MT ARNG 
units utilizing the identified primary location, Gowen 
Field, for Annual Training activities.
3. A description of the Montana Training Center in 
terms of facilities, geographical location, configuration 
and projected training activities.
4. A description of the proposed training area's 
physical environment and the accompanying controversy.
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5. The general economic status of Valley County 
and the State of Montana, with respective data showing 
Montana National Guard economic impact.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the development of 
the Montana Training Center would benefit the Montana Army 
National Guard and the State of Montana. Using c[uantita- 
tive models supported by qualitative understanding, an 
analysis will be constructed to arrive at an assessment of 
the proposed training center. The assessment will 
critically appraise the MTC, its physical and operational 
parameters, its developmental process, its impact upon the 
MT ARNG training program and its prospective economic 
impact on the state and on Valley County. Based upon said 
research, this paper will ultimately present recommenda­
tions regarding the development of the Montana Training 
Center.
Having asserted the intent of this paper, it must be 
noted that the development, usage and impacts of the 
Montana Training Center are both complex and controver­
sial. Every effort has been made to present information 
pertinent to the issues in a concise and cumulative 
format, thereby providing a substantive feasibility study 
of the development of the Montana Training Center.
CHAPTER TWO 
MONTANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ANNUAL TRAINING
The Montana Army National Guard is comprised primarily 
of the 163d AR BDE. Of the 3,212 soldiers (as of Jan. 3, 
1990) who are in the MT ARNG, 2,555 (or 79.5 percent) are 
assigned to 163d AR BDE units. The other units (see 
Appendix A) are, as is the 163d, unique to each other in 
their resources and wartime mission. The primary common­
ality they share is that all are subordinate units to 
Headquarters, State Area Command (HQ STARC). Because of 
the differing specialties of the units, different training 
sites are required and utilized for the Annual Training 
period. While the 163d AR BDE Annual Training is 
typically held at Gowen Field because it is conducive to 
tank operations, the 1049th Engineer Platoon often 
performs its Annual Training at the city firefighting 
training center in Great Falls where it can optimally 
train for its military mission. An additional example is 
the 103d Public Affairs Detachment which has conducted its 
Annual Training periods in such places as Korea and 
Panama. These locations provide maximal training for this 
unit's mission, the gathering and reporting of news that
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is military in nature. Appendix A lists the locations of 
each MT ARNG unit's typical Annual Training location.
The Gowen Field training site is, by far, the most 
extensively utilized Annual Training location by NT ARNG 
units. Therefore, it is the greatest training and econ­
omic investment that the MT ARNG makes each year. The 
Montana Training Center would replace Gowen Field as the 
Annual Training location for MT ARNG units. The primary 
advantages and disadvantages of training at Gowen Field 
are:
1. Gowen Field Training Advantages.
a. Gowen Field is operationally ready for 
Annual Training activities. The facilities (barracks, 
dining, medical/dental, social, etc.) and field training 
areas are established and functional.
b. Gowen Field is designated by National Guard 
Bureau as the regional maintenance/training center for the 
Ml Abrams main battle tank. The great majority of the 
163d AR BDE's weapons and training activities revolve 
around the Ml Abrams main battle tank. It is critical, 
therefore, that the training site have a maintenance 
activity capable of supporting continuous, extensive usage 
of this tracked vehicle. A complimentary activity is the 
Ml tank maintenance training capability. This provides 
appropriate training to those soldiers of the 163d AR BDE 
who are tracked vehicle mechanics.
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c. Gowen Field is the Mobilization Station for 
the great majority of MT ARNG units (see Appendix A). A 
Mobilization Station is the designated facility where MT 
ARNG units, upon Federalization, must travel to and stay 
for a specific period of time before, in accordance with 
classified timetables, they continue on to the embarkation 
site(s). While there, the Federalized unit will complete 
final preparations needed for deployment to its overseas 
assignment, in accordance with the instituted war plan. 
Having Annual Training at Gowen Field facilitates unit 
awareness, coordination and rapport with the mobilization 
activity's organization, personnel, equipment and 
structural resources.
2. Gowen Field Training Disadvantages.
a. Valuable training time is lost due to the 
length of time it takes to convoy troops and equipment to 
and from Gowen Field. While units in western Montana can 
lose up to 4 days due to travel time, units from eastern 
Montana can lose up to 6 days. Given that the total span 
of Annual Training is 15 days long, the travel time can 
account for, respectively, 25 to 40 percent of the total 
training time available. See Appendix B for mapped 
locations of 163d AR BDE units. Also the mileage from 
each unit to Gowen Field and the mileage to the Operations 
Center of the proposed Montana Training Center is shown.
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Training time lost due to travel significantly detracts 
from the opportunity for the soldiers and command 
structure to increase proficiency on equipment, tactical 
operations, and command and control functions. The 
abbreviated training time also inhibits the unit's 
identification of capability and resource shortfalls and 
deficiencies. These must be identified so that they can 
be addressed and remedied. The Annual Training period at 
Gowen Field is the onlv time and place during the training 
year where comprehensive weapons, tactics, and command and 
control training activities/exercises can be conducted.
b. The Annual Training period assigned to 
Montana units is ultimately determined by the Gowen Field 
administration, with input from the MT ARNG command 
structure. Gowen Field is used extensively by many Active 
and Reserve Component military organizations. As a 
result, there has been a significantly decreasing 
capability for the MT ARNG to attain Annual Training dates 
most appropriate or convenient to MT ARNG needs. An 
example of this is the fact that there has been little 
consistency as to the time-span when Montana units are 
scheduled to train. The last few years have seen the 
Annual Training periods range from March to July. This 
negatively impacts, in varying degrees, a unit's yearly 
training program. Most serious, however, are the 
resultant problems created concerning Guardsman's
13
employment, education and/or personal needs.
The inconsistent Annual Training dates can create havoc 
with a soldier's employment, educational and/or personal 
responsibilities. This potentially leads to stress 
between the soldier and his/her employer, course 
instructor or family which can result in the soldier being 
forced to "choose" between the Guard or job/education/ 
family. If this situation develops, typically the soldier 
will terminate his/her membership in the Guard. This is 
detrimental to the MT ARNG organization since the soldier 
and the resources invested into him/her are lost to the 
unit. Personnel turnover can result in a lessened unit 
readiness status because the skills of that soldier are no 
longer available and the unit is also, in effect, 
"shorthanded".
c. Gowen Field's facilities, training areas and 
support services are limited due to heavy usage by other 
military organizations. Even though the 163d AR BDE would 
be deployed as one unit if Federalized, it has never been 
able to train as one unit at Gowen Field, The inability 
for the entire 163d AR BDE to train at one time and place 
detracts from the ultimate capability of the organiza­
tional structure to function in a coordinated, efficient 
and effective manner. Needless to say, this also negates 
any possibility for the 163d AR BDE to train concurrently
14
with other military organizations. Given the battlefield 
context into which the 163d would be placed, combined arms 
training is increasingly vital to unit readiness and 
capability for mission accomplishment, and ultimately, 
survivability on the battlefield.
d. Expenditures in the form of organizational 
acquisitions such as fuel, rations (food), billets 
(housing) and personal outlays for recreation, etc. amount 
to a considerable outflow of fiscal resources from Montana 
and is, for the most part, lost from the Montana economy. 
This outflow is significant in that the wages, payments, 
etc. do not originate from the Montana public or private 
sector fiscal resource base. They are entirely federal 
funds.
CHAPTER THREE 
THE MONTANA TRAINING CENTER
The Montana National Guard proposes to create a ground 
and air maneuver and gunnery training site in Valley 
County. It would encompass 981,366 acres (approximately 
1,533 square miles, 3 0 percent of the county's land mass) 
and would be divided into two separate, major training 
sectors. The Operations Center of the Montana Training 
Center would be located at the currently deactivated 
Glasgow Air Force Base which is located about 19 miles 
north of the City of Glasgow. The MTC would be under the 
control of the State of Montana, with the Administrator of 
the State Department of Military Affairs, Office of The 
Adjutant General having full responsibility for all 
aspects of the Center's operations. Funding, prospec- 
tively, would be through a combination of federal and 
state sources under the auspices of The Adjutant General.
If developed, the MTC would be, by far, the largest 
training site in the United States.  ̂ This distinction is 
in terms of gross acreage and actual acreage used for 
training purposes. The National Training Center at Ft. 
Irwin, California, while currently the largest at almost
15
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1000 square miles, would be but two-thirds the size. The 
immensity and geographical characteristics of the MTC make 
possible a vast spectrum of training activities which 
could range from accommodating a MT ARNG tank company 
(approximately 76 men and 14 tanks) during a weekend drill 
to the entire current force structure (163d AR BDE plus 
other units as identified in Appendix A) of the MT ARNG 
(potentially 3,813 personnel, 125 tanks, 148 armored 
personnel carriers, etc.) during an Annual Training 
period. This represents an unprecedented level of 
quality and flexibility of training for not only Montana 
National Guard units, but also for any other military 
combat organization that may hold its training there.
1. Purpose. The mission of the Montana Training 
Center is to plan, coordinate and conduct an advanced 
level of training for Army and Air Force units of both 
Reserve and Active Component forces under mid- to 
high-intensity combat conditions. This is accomplished by 
requiring participating units to deploy tactically in 
response to a realistic portrayal of potential enemy 
forces, all in the context of continuous, stressful "force 
on force" combat operations and actual weapons fire 
exercises. Each training activity would incorporate 
extensive analysis and feedback. The training activities 
would vary in complexity and purpose depending upon the 
needs of the participating unit(s).
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2. Description of the Montana Training Center. The
lands and facilities which make up the 981,366 acres are a 
mixture of federal, state, county and private ownership 
(see Appendix C). The great majority of the acreage
(718,316 or 73 percent) belongs to the U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management (ELM). Access to ELM and state lands would be
negotiated through long-term lease agreements to insure a
stable development program. Private lands would be
negotiated on a case by case basis. Presented below are 
the physical descriptions of the major sectors of the 
Montana Training Center and the most significant training 
activities to be conducted in each.
a. Valley County Airport Enterprise. Ease 
opertions would be located at what is termed the Valley 
County Airport Enterprise (VCAE), which is the former 
Glasgow Air Force Ease installation (6,800 acres). The 
name was changed to reflect ownership by Valley County and 
is a corporate entity created by the county to do 
business. The VCAE is considered part of the northern 
training sector of the Montana Training Center.
Significant assets would be available to MTC operations 
and include, but are not limited to;
(1) 13,500 X 300 ft. concrete airstrip 
capable of supporting loads in excess 
of one million pounds.
(2) Airfield tower and operations building.
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(3) Aircraft hangers and maintenance 
facilities.
(4) Multiple-bay fire station.
(5) Billeting for 2,700 soldiers, permanent 
structures.
(6) Central dining facility.
(7) 50-bed hospital.
(8) Dental clinic.
(9) Extensive ammunition bunker complex.
10) Fuel storage capacity of 3,170,000 
gallons.
11) Over 1 million sq. ft. of warehouse 
space.
12) Maintenance facilities for heavy motor 
vehicle repair, including tanks.
13) Extensive classroom and administration 
facilities.
14) Post office.
15) Library.
16) Chapel.
17) Theater.
18) Gymnasium.
19) Electrical power with transformer 
capacity of 10,000 KVA.
20) Modern water treatment plant with 
capacity of processing 3,009,600 
gallons per day. Storage capacity of 
approximately 1,100,000 gallons.
21) Sewage collection and transport to 
lagoons through a system of lateral and 
main lines and lift stations. The
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lagoons have a capacity of 3 34 acre 
feet, adequate for a base population of 
8,500 personnel.
(22) The structures are heated by natural 
gas.
No new construction is necessary to house Base 
Operations activities at the VCAE. Base Operations 
responsibilities include all administrative and logistical 
activities necessary in the day to day operations of the 
Montana Training Center. These include but are not 
limited to:
(1) Administer training unit's schedules. 
Coordinate all activities peculiar to 
training exercise, i.e., air and ground 
support, special equipment, specific 
facilities, etc..
(2) Assist in writing exercise scenarios.
(3) Provide full support to personnel
residing permanently at the VCAE.
(4) Provide full support to personnel/units
training at the VCAE.
(5) Monitor compliance with established 
environmental protection/rehabilitation 
programs.
(6) Administer and execute continual 
environmental rehabilitation program 
and process.
(7) Manage equipment and supplies storage.
(8) Schedule maintenance activities.
(9) Manage VCAE and MTC security.
(10) Purchase supplies (fuel, food, 
medicine, etc.).
Base Operations functions at the Montana Training Center
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would draw upon the support of the local community. All 
supplies and equipment necessary for the normal operations 
of the MTC would, to the greatest extent possible, be 
purchased directly or contracted from local sources.
b. The Tactical Maneuver Area (northern 
section, 572,660 acres including the VCAE complex). The 
Tactical Maneuver Area (TMA) is located adjacent to the 
VCAE and extends north and northwest to the U.S./Canadian 
border. Activity in the TMA would be limited to ground 
maneuver and close air support activities conducted on a 
rotational basis through seven separate maneuver 
corridors. The corridor selection for training would be 
based upon multiple use, soils damage, reseeding, wildlife 
and other considerations. The units which are training 
can maneuver only in the selected corridor. Permanently 
assigned MTC personnel and designated "umpires" schedule 
corridor usage and monitor compliance. Appendix C 
illustrates the configuration of the TMA. Training 
activities to be conducted in the Tactical Maneuver Area 
include:
(1) Ground Movement. Military units would 
travel cross-country using tanks, armored personnel and 
artillery carriers, and wheeled vehicles. Cross-country 
movement would take place day and night.
(2) Tactical Road March. A tactical road
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march is the movement of units from one location to 
another. Such movement is usually done with units moving 
along a route in a column formation. It usually is used 
to move units from one assembly area to another or from an 
assembly area to a defensive position.
(3) Assemblv Area Operations. An assembly 
area is used to prepare for the training exercises. 
Activities in the assembly area include all the 
administrative and logistical activities necessary to 
conduct the exercise; such as loading ammunition, fueling 
vehicles and maintaining equipment. All training 
exercises begin in an assembly area.
(4) Attack Operations. Units move from the
assembly area on several routes and in a variety of 
formations (such as side-by-side, column, etc.) to attack 
and occupy a designated piece of terrain.
(5) Defense Operations. Once the unit has
achieved its objective (a designated piece of terrain), 
they occupy defensive positions. At some point in the 
exercise, the unit is attacked by an opposing force which 
attempts to test the unit's defensive positions. The 
unit must defend against the opposing force.
(6) Delav Operations. If the opposing
force is successful, the unit is required to withdraw from
its defensive positions. This is done by moving elements 
from respective defensive positions to a series of
22
preplanned defensive positions to the rear.
(7) Pursuit Operations. During combat the 
opposing force may retreat. Pursuit training deals with 
the tactics of pursuit.
(8) Withdrawal Operations. A unit 
withdrawal is conducted when it is ordered to leave its 
forward defensive positions and move to another area of 
the battlefield. A unit withdraws once another unit moves 
forward and takes over the battle positions and defensive 
mission. Fighting positions are turned over to the 
substituting element one at a time. The relieving unit 
moves into the same vehicle and personnel positions 
occupied by the withdrawing unit. The maneuver is 
conducted as rapidly and as quietly as possible so as to 
not alert the opposing force of the movement.
(9) Relief Operations. A relief is the 
exact opposite of a withdrawal. In a relief, a unit moves 
from the assembly area and occupies the defensive 
positions of a unit. The relief, movement and change-over 
must be done without letting the opposing force know what 
is occurring.
(10) Raid Operation. A raid is the 
penetration into enemy territory with a specialized force 
to destroy a specific target or capture specific 
information and return to friendly positions. It is
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characterized by rapid maneuver and extensive use of 
supporting units.
(11) Disengagement Operations. During 
combat^ it may be necessary to withdraw from the battle. 
Disengagement operations training deals with the tactics 
of "retreat".
(12) Guard Operations. A unit in a "guard" 
posture deploys along the side or rear of its parent unit. 
Its purpose is to protect these areas against surprise 
enemy activity. Guard requires extensive patrolling to 
ensure that enemy activity is detected and reported.
(13) Engineer Operations. Engineer training 
activities can be divided into four basic areas:
(a) Countermobility Operations. 
Countermobility is obstacle construction. Obstacles are 
used to decrease the opposing force's mobility without 
hindering friendly maneuver. In open areas, obstacles 
extend the amount of time the opposing force's units will 
be exposed to the effects of "friendly fire". One example 
includes the various types of anti-tank ditches.
(b) Mobility Operations. Mobility 
operations reduce the effects of natural or man-made 
obstacles which impede the movement of friendly forces or 
supplies. Examples include the demolition or 
dismemberment of various obstacles.
(c) Survivability Operations. Surviv­
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ability operations are characterized by the use of 
protective measures that decrease the effectiveness of the 
opposing force's firepower while units fight and maneuver. 
Survivability measures include the use of counter­
surveillance measures such as camouflage, deception, smoke 
and the construction of protective positions.
(d) Sustainment Engineering Opera­
tions. Engineers complete tasks to ensure the continuous 
supply of support assets to units. These tasks include 
replacement of tactical bridges, construction and repair 
of support facilities, and area damage control.
NOTE: All engineer operations in the TMA are restricted
to one specific location (see Appendix C)•
(14) Simulated Chemical Weapons Operations. 
Non-toxic, simulated chemical weapons would be used 
throughout the training exercises to simulate chemical 
weapons attacks.
All activities listed are designed to be integrated for 
a comprehensive program of movement and tactics training. 
The TMA can accommodate an entire brigade through a 12-day 
exercise schedule or a company through a 3-day exercise 
schedule. Specific training activities can be conducted 
if time or needs do not necessitate the complete program. 
Training activities are rotated and time-spaced between 
corridors to minimize environmental damage and maximize
2 5
rehabilitation by natural and programmed processes.
c. The Fire and Maneuver Area (southern sector, 
408,706 acres). The Fire and Maneuver Area (FMA) is 
designed to train units in the techniques of maneuver and 
target gunnery. The area would be divided into special­
ized firing ranges keyed to specific weapons systems. 
Ground units would move through the area in designated 
controlled corridors and shoot at predesignated targets. 
Aircraft would fly within designated airspace and shoot at 
ground and towed aerial targets or would drop bombs on 
ground targets. Some high-explosive ordnance would be 
used. All high-explosive ordnance would be fired or 
dropped into one designated target area. Appendix C 
identifies each range and area. Training activities to be 
conducted at the Fire and Maneuver Area include:
(1) Ground Movement Operations. Tactical 
Road March, Assembly Area Operations, Attack Operations, 
Defense Operations, Delay Operations, Pursuit Operations, 
Withdrawal Operations, Relief Operations, Raid Operations, 
Disengagement Operations, Guard Operations and Simulated 
Chemical Weapons Operations will be conducted in the FMA 
just as previously described in the Tactical Maneuver Area 
narrative.
(2) Engineer Operations. Combat engineers 
will construct various anti-tank ditches, bunker complexes 
and individual vehicle fighting positions. However, most
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of the engineer efforts and projects will be in the TMA.
(3) Artillery Target Area. The artillery 
target area is the only designated high-explosive impact 
area. Exploding munitions would be fired into this impact 
area of approximately 5000 acres and would be (for safety 
reasons) the only part of the training area permanently 
restricted to other land users. All other impact areas 
would be designated for non-exploding munitions and would 
be unrestricted when not being used for gunnery exercises.
(4) Tank Target Area. Tanks and armored 
personnel carriers would fire 105mm cannon, anti-tank 
missiles, 25mm cannon, various machine guns, rifles and 
pistols at pop-up targets placed throughout the tank 
target area. Cannon and missile rounds are for practice 
only; they duplicate all characteristics of an explosive 
round except for the explosion itself.
(5) Attack Helicopter Target Area. Heli­
copters would fire 30mm cannon practice rounds, anti-tank 
missiles and machine guns at ground targets while flying 
and hovering in the target area.
(6) Tactical Air-to-Surface Gunnerv Range. 
High-speed jet aircraft would fly into the area, shoot at 
and drop nonexploding bombs on ground targets. High- 
explosive bombs would be dropped only within the Artillery 
Target Area. Practice bombs would be dropped on targets
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outside the artillery area.
(7) Air-to-Air Gunnerv Range. An aerial 
target would be towed by an aircraft in an established 
pattern within the range. The aircraft doing the shooting 
would fly into the area and shoot at the towed target with 
20mm cannon. The Air-to-Air Gunnery Impact Area is the 
surface danger zone within which all bullets fired at the 
target would fall.
(8) Controlled Air-to-Surface Gunnerv 
Range. Aircraft would make precision-scored bombing runs 
on surveyed targets. The aircraft would drop 2 5 lb. 
practice bombs while being observed and scored by 
personnel in towers adjacent to the target area.
(9) Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise 
fCALFEX). A CALFEX trains unit commanders in the 
techniques and procedures involved with employing ground 
and air forces together in simulated battle. This 
exercise would be conducted in the Tank Target Area. A 
unit or task force would move down a set course with tanks 
and armored personnel carriers moving together. They 
would shoot at ground targets while on the move, as well 
as during predesignated stops. Infantrymen would exit the 
carriers and shoot at ground targets at certain points 
along the course. Aircraft would shoot at ground targets 
in combination with artillery support. The purpose of 
this range exercise is to test the commander's abilities
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to coordinate all aspects of the battle, including the 
support assets available to his unit.
(10) Range Operations Center. Control and 
field administration of activities in the Fire and 
Maneuver Area during periods of maneuver and gunnery 
exercises would be done from a Range Operations Center. 
This would require the construction of facilities, 
installation of technical instrumentation, leveling and 
graveling of parking areas, drilling and installation of a 
water well, installation of a sewer system and introduc­
tion of electrical power. Live-fire exercises at the FMA 
would be conducted using the Army standard design Multi­
purpose Range Complex (MPRC). The MPRC is an instru­
mented, fully automated target practice range which allows 
moving tanks, armored personnel carriers and personnel to 
maneuver through a pre-set course, firing at stationary 
and moving targets. It allows for helicopter and fighter 
aircraft and artillery fire engagements to take place 
simultaneously with the ground maneuver forces. It is 
designed to support technically advanced and tactically 
active training while replicating realistic combat 
conditions. The instrumentation system permits simulated 
or live-fire training scenarios approaching conditions to 
be found in battle and provides the data necessary to 
formulate an objective evaluation of the unit performance.
29
3. Montana Training Center Impact. The MTC would 
be unique, on a national scale, in its capabilities and 
potential. Facilities and training areas sufficient to 
conduct opposing brigade-sized Field Training Exercises
and Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises are not in existence
2anywhere else in the United States. Gunnery ranges would 
be available to train Army ground (tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, artillery, soldiers) and air (attack 
helicopter) assets as well as all Air Force (jet and 
bomber) assets in both actual exercise play or strictly 
weapons systems familiarization and/or qualification. The 
combined arms training would vary with the size and types 
of units involved; however, sufficient maneuver acreage is 
present to accommodate any foreseeable need.
Current training maneuvers planning has identified a 
prospective schedule which incorporates the environmental, 
geographical and social (i.e., hunting season) consider­
ations of the proposed training area. Brigade sized 
training exercises could occur up to 4 times per year with 
each training exercise lasting approximately 15-21 days. 
Battalion and company-sized units could also conduct IDT 
training up to 4 6 times per year. Aerial gunnery exer­
cises of up to 50 aircraft (fighters, bombers, attack 
helicopters) could take place on the ranges and in the 
associated airspace, including air-to-air gunnery 
approximately 72 days per year and air-to-ground gunnery
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approximately 250 days per year. The size of the training 
area allows air and ground training activities to occur 
simultaneously, either in conjunction with or separate 
from each other.
As remarkable as it may seem, no other existing training 
area in the United States currently has the size, 
capability or flexibility as does the proposed Montana 
Training Center.
CHAPTER FOUR 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
The climate and topography in the Montana Training 
Center are representative of locations to which the 163d 
AR BDE and other MT ARNG units are expected to be deployed 
in the event of federal activation. These locations 
include (depending upon the specific unit) Europe, Korea 
and the Middle East. Weather and soil conditions allow 
ground maneuver training to occur 10 months a year; aerial 
training would occur throughout the year. If the MTC were 
to reach its full potential of utilization, the year-round 
training load would approximate 14,919 personnel, 3,194 
wheeled vehicles and 1,553 tracked vehicles. Units would 
be in the field 230 days per year. Additionally, there 
would be localized training in the VCAE area. The only 
restrictions to the military training would occur during 
high-density multi-user periods, high-value wildlife use 
periods, critical periods of agricultural production and a 
total ban on ground maneuver training during the months of 
May and June. (Because these months receive the greatest 
quantity of rainfall for the year, the environment is most 
susceptable to tracked vehicle damage.) To say the least,
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the presence of the Montana Training Center would have a 
marked, dominant and far-reaching impact on the environ­
ment in 3 0 percent of Valley County. Described below is 
the general environmental context of the Montana Training 
Center.^
1. Climate. Summer temperatures are hot with 
maximum temperatures into the 100 degree (plus) Fahrenheit 
range. Winters are cold at best and life-threateningly 
frigid at worst. Temperatures commonly are sub-zero with 
wind chill factors producing temperatures anywhere from 
-20 to -70 degrees Fahrenheit.
a. The training area averages 11.53 inches of 
precipitation annually, approximately 40 percent of which 
falls between 1 May and 30 June. The months of May and 
June are therefore closed to ground maneuver training in 
both the TMA and FMA.
b. Winds are prevalent year-round with typical 
intensity of 7-15 miles per hour. The predominant wind 
direction is from the northwest,
2. Air Oualitv. Air quality is excellent because 
of the lack of human activity and nearby industry. All 
the public lands have Class II air quality (good), as set 
by the State of Montana. Particulate concentrations are 
highest during spring and summer due to nearby farming 
operations (such as plowing) and are lowest in the winter.
3. Topography. The training area is located in the
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glaciated Missouri Plateau. The topography consists of 
flat to gently rolling terrain with rugged denuded 
badlands type relief in some areas. Elevations within the 
area range from 2,000 feet in the southern sector of the 
area to 4,000 feet in the northern sector. Drainage 
systems in the northern sector are complex, with the West 
Fork of the Poplar River draining much of the hilly 
northeast corner. Porcupine Creek in the central area, and 
the Milk River, fed by many small (and usually dry) 
tributaries, the balance. The drainage in the 
predominately "badland" southern sector is easterly into 
Willow Creek, which drains into the Milk River.
Typically, however, these drainages are dry.
4. Recreation. Big game, upland bird and waterfowl 
hunting are the major recreational activities in the 
proposed training area. The area is known locally as a 
source of trophy mule deer bucks. Reservoirs provide 
waterfowl habitat and some limited hunting opportunities.
A few of the reservoirs serve as trout fisheries. Off-road 
vehicle use, usually associated with hunting, is common 
throughout the area. This use is restricted to designated 
roads, trails and vehicle ways. Local residents also use 
the area for snowmobi1ing during the heavier snow years. 
Other recreational uses include camping, backpacking and 
nature study.
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5. Cultural. Information about cultural resources 
in the area has been collected mainly from clearances 
conducted for range projects by the Bureau of Land Manage­
ment. Other archeological fieldwork (random sampling) has 
also contributed data which provides information about the 
number, quality and type of prehistoric and historic 
features present in the study area.
a. Remnants of human occupation dating back 
12,000 years can be found in the region. Prehistoric 
people who frequented the area were hunters and gatherers. 
They shifted residences in response to seasonal changes in 
food resource opportunities and the never-ending needs of 
defense, shelter, water, fuel and raw materials for tool 
production. These groups were usually small, possessing 
only what appears to be a limited set of stone, wood and 
bone tools. Bison eventually became a major food source 
as newer techniques of trapping the animals were 
developed. The remaining traces of these early peoples 
include teepee rings, lithic scatters, bison butchering 
sites and isolated stone tools. Examples of these sites 
are situated throughout the proposed training area, the 
majority located in the vicinity of water sources.
b. A portion of the public lands in the 
proposed training site area is what were termed "land 
utilization lands" or "homestead". These lands were in 
private ownership for a time and then reverted back to
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public ownership when the settlers vacated the area, 
primarily because of the harsh environment and national 
depression in the 1930*s.
6. Watershed/Soils, The training area is composed 
of several distinct soil types, two of which make up the 
majority of the proposed training center. The first type 
includes approximately 70 percent of the area and consists 
of shallow to moderately deep acid clay soils on moderate­
ly steep to very steep shale uplands. These lands consist 
of dissected drainage systems with shale outcrops on the 
ridge crests and steep side slopes. The rangelands are 
marginal with only 35-45 percent ground cover. The 
surface is characterized in many places by deposits of 
glacial rock. The soils are characterized by moderate to 
high runoff and the erosion potential is considered 
moderate to severe. The second type of soil includes the 
remaining 30 percent of the area and contains high bench 
remnants of continental glacial till. The soils are deep 
clay loam glacial till mantle on nearly level to gently 
rolling topography, supporting substantially more ground 
cover and higher production potential. Runoff and erosion 
potential are both moderate.
7. Water Oualitv. There is a very limited supply 
of water in the proposed training area, consisting of 
primarily ephemeral streams and man-made reservoirs.
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typically less than 5 acres in size. Water plays a 
minimal role in the recreational use of this area, but no 
doubt played a maximal role in the transiency of 
homesteaders during the land utilization program days. 
Waters in the area typically contain high concentrations 
of ionic salts (highly saline) and are rated as fair to 
poor depending on the time of the year and the source.
8. Vegetation. The most common plant species in 
the area include western wheatgrass, needle and thread, 
blue grama, prairie sanreed, native legumes, silver 
sagebrush, creeping juniper, chokecherries, silver
buffaloberry and isolated non-commercial strands of aspen. 
No commercial timber exists in the area.
a. No rare or endangered plant species are 
known to exist on the public lands in the proposed 
training area.
b. Leafy spurge is the only noxious plant found 
in the area and is found at various locations throughout 
the training site. Known sites are treated with herbi­
cides which have not allowed the size of the infestation 
to grow.
c. Plants poisonous to livestock are found in 
the area but have not posed any major problems to date. 
These species include cocklebur, greasewood and 
chokecherry.
9. Wildlife. The wildlife found in the proposed
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training site is typical of the eastern glaciated plains. 
The abundance of some species is attributed to the higher 
percentage of badlands/breaks and open rolling pfairie 
landform in the area.
a. Mule deer are abundant throughout the area. 
The badland/breaks topography combined with native prairie 
landform lends itself to the needs of these deer on a 
yearlong basis and several acreages are considered 
particularly important as winter habitat. This acreage is 
located primarily along water course beds and adjoining 
hillsides.
b. A few white-tailed deer occur in a small 
portion of the area. The quaking aspen groves around the 
eastern perimeter of the Bitter Creek area (northern 
sector) provide the only suitable whitetail habitat of any 
consequence.
c. Antelope use both the breaks and benchlands 
located throughout the area. Their spring, summer and 
fall numbers vary in any one location due to the 
topography. Winter concentrations of pronghorn occur in 
the general location of the mule deer winter habitat.
d. Sage and sharp-tailed grouse can be found. 
Population levels of these two species would best be 
characterized as moderate. Small numbers and widely 
scattered flocks of gray, or Hungarian partridge also
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occur within the area.
e. All the geese, ducks and shorebird species 
common to the glaciated plains can be found in the area. 
They do not occur in any large concentrations or in large 
numbers.
10. Threatened/Endangered Species. Migrating bald 
eagles pass through this area. However a 1984 nesting 
survey found no nesting pairs in the county. Peregrine 
falcons migrate through selected areas, but there is no 
known existing or potential nesting habitat. There is the 
potential for black-footed ferret habitat, but no 
sightings have been made.
11. Enerav and Mineral Resources. There is no 
known mineral production within the area. However, the 
area does have varying potential for bentonite, uranium, 
natural gas, sand and gravel and geothermal energy 
sources.
a. Natural gas is the only energy resource 
having a high potential for occurrence in the area. 
However, no successful wells have been drilled to date. 
From 1972 to 1981, Valley County's wildcat success rate 
was 0 percent while adjacent Phillips County's success 
rate was 15 percent.
b. The Federal government owns the mineral 
rights on all the public lands in the area. There is one 
abandoned bentonite mine in the southern sector. The
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mineral rights on this 160 acre parcel are privately 
owned.
c. The State of Montana owns all surface and 
mineral rights on state lands. These state lands are 
subject to development and access, and are open to mineral 
and grazing leasing. The lands are physically similar to 
the surrounding federal land.
12. Private Land Holdings. There are 151,150 acres 
of private land located within the proposed training site. 
These private inholdings are subject to development and 
reasonable access rights. Except for farming in selected 
locations, stock water ponds, and vehicle ways, the 
private inholdings are undeveloped and physically similar 
to the surrounding public and state lands.
Considerable apprehension exists among Valley County 
residents and other interested parties concerning the 
impact of training site activities on the land and 
wildlife. The majority of the apprehension is centered on 
the tracked vehicles, particularly the 60-ton Ml Abrams 
main battle tank and, to a lesser degree, the 18-ton 
armored personnel carrier. There is no question that 
these vehicles will definitely disturb the natural state 
of the ground. The balance of said apprehension centers 
on the effect of the noise emitted from the vehicles and 
aircraft on the wildlife. Several local landowners and
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environmental groups, including Preserve Rural America, 
Citizen's Alert, The Rural Alliance for Military 
Accountability, SKYGUARD, the Northern Plains Research 
Council and the National Wildlife Federation (among 
others) are decidedly opposed to the development.
Certainly, a very extensive and intensive Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) must be developed to fully address 
all of the concerns of the Valley County residents and 
environmentalist community; and to also satisfy the 
mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and Threatened and Endangered Species Act. The NEPA 
directed EIS would meet the legal and administrative 
requirements of the Montana Environmental Policy Act 
(MEPA), to which the development of the MTC is also 
subject. This would then preclude EIS duplication by the 
State of Montana or its subordinate agencies such as the 
State Departments of Lands or Military Affairs. It also 
provides the mechanism by which the State Department of 
Land's holdings can be included in the EIS. The evalu­
ation of the Montana Training Center and the products 
thereof must meet the mandates of the Federal Land Use 
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The quality of the 
data, supporting materials, and the resulting evaluation 
of the MTC must be such that it can be readily understood 
by the public and cooperating agencies, and ultimately, be 
able to withstand the scrutiny and/or challenge of
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Congress and the courts. Estimates of the cost of the EIS 
range from $250,000.00 to a hefty $6,819,600.00.^ The 
wide disparity in the estimated cost of the EIS is due to 
who would prepare the EIS. If the BLM prepares it, it 
will cost the maximum. Interested contracters have 
projected the minimum.
The VCAE and the MT ARNG signed a 2-year lease agree­
ment, effective July of 1989, allowing tracked vehicle 
training on the Enterprise premises and usage of specific 
structural resources. A reclamation program is currently 
underway which is studying the most effective method of 
rehabilitating the soil displaced by the tracked vehicles. 
Four different reclamation methods have been initiated, 
these include:
1. No reclamation attempted.
2. Chisel-plow the impacted area.
3. Grade the impacted area.
4. Grade and seed the impacted area.
This study will span a three-year period. It is 
designed to provide reclamation data which will be applied 
to the "rotation" system of tracked vehicle training to be 
conducted in the different corridors.
CHAPTER FIVE
ECONOMIC IMPACT
While there are those who would favor Montana * s National 
Guard having a state-based major training site for the 
sake of a better prepared military force, there are 
probably just as many who would prefer to keep such an 
activity out of Montana for environmental and/or 
ideological reasons. Ultimately, any prospective state 
investment of financial and political resources or 
widespread populace support for such a training area is 
dependent upon a demonstrated potential for generating 
revenue in excess of the developmental and maintenance 
costs. Indeed, the basic methodological problem is 
quantifying the various costs and benefits associated with 
such a proposal. The full extent of the expense, given 
construction, refurbishment and maintenance needs, private 
lands acquisition, impact on school trust lands revenue, 
recreation, EIS, etc. cannot be fully determined at this 
time. Just as certainly, the economic benefits of such a 
site are unclear and cannot be accurately measured. There 
is, however, evidence of the economic impact the Montana 
National Guard has had on Montana and in Valley County.
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This information will be presented in the general context 
of Montana's and Valley County's economic environment.
1. The General Economic Environment of Montana. An
article in the most recent edition of Montana Business 
Quarterly stated that the state's economy, as measured by 
non-farm labor income will grow by 1.7 percent in 1989 and 
then improve 1-5 percent annually in 1990 and 1991. Paul 
Polzin, Director of the University of Montana's Business 
and Economic Research, states that "This is only a modest 
increase by U.S. standards, but it certainly looks good 
compared to the declines we've experienced in six of the 
last nine years." What growth the state has experienced 
is due primarily to the expansion of Montana's mining 
industries and the stabilization of employment declines 
for railroads and oil and gas exploration companies. 
However, Polzin also states that if a predicted nationwide 
recession occurs, "all bets are off". Even if the 
national economy remains stable, Montana's economy will 
still trail the expected national pace of about 2.3 
percent annual growth, and in fact, the economy of Montana 
has shrunk by an estimated 9 percent during the past 
decade. This is evidenced by the projection that an 
increase of approximately 6,000 non-farm jobs between 
1988-91 will make the job total in 1991 only slightly 
higher than in 1979.^
Montana's economy has lost significant ground during the
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1980*s and if Mr. Polzin*s projections are valid, the 
early 1990 * s will regain little of the state * s lost 
economic strength. One of the more discouraging 
indicators of the Montana economy is a decrease in 
population significant enough to possibly lose a seat in 
the United States House of Representatives. The state * s 
personal property tax is regarded by many as the primary 
growth retardant. Dennis Burr, President of the Montana 
Taxpayers Association maintains that the high tax rates on 
business personal property has made Montana noncompetitive 
with other states in the region. He states, **The tax 
system has become an important element in location 
decisions and business has been leaving Montana for more 
favorable tax treatment in other states. ** He further 
notes that between 1985 and 1988 more than $3 00 million 
worth of business machinery and equipment has been removed 
from Montana, and therefore, Montana * s property tax base. 
Comparative examples of Montana * s personal property tax 
and its impact on business are:^
a. Stone Container is in the paper products 
industry with 175 facilities and sales of $6 billion. In 
1990, the Missoula plant will pay almost $4 million in 
personal property taxes. This represents the highest of 
the 12 facilities in Stone * s mill division. The next 
highest personal property tax cost is at the mill in
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Snowflake, Arizona which pays $1.5 million. Plants in 
Hodge, Louisiana and in Florida and Georgia will pay about 
$1.2 million and $1 million respectively.
b. General Mills operates seven flour mills in 
six states. Its plant in Great Falls produces 8 percent 
of total daily production, but accounts for 25 percent of 
the total property tax paid on the seven plants. Property 
taxes in Great Falls are equivalent to $43.00 per 
hundredweight of product compared to an average in the 
other states of $9.20.
c. The Western Sugar plant in Billings produces 
24 percent of the company's sugar and pays 52 percent of 
the company's property tax. A piece of equipment on which 
property taxes of $1,278.00 were paid in 1988 in Lovell, 
Wyoming is assessed a $9,366.00 tax in Billings.
d. U.S. West paid property taxes equivalent to 
$32.15 per $1,000.00 of investment in Montana in 1985, but 
averaged $15.44 per $1,000.00 in the other seven states in 
which it operates.
A strategy the Montana Legislature has used is to offer 
specific out-of-state business interests personal property 
tax breaks as an incentive to locate in Montana. Examples 
include the now established Canola plant in Butte and a 
proposed (though ultimately not placed) malting barley 
plant in Billings. There are those who would wonder why a 
Montana business does not deserve a tax break at least as
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much as an out-of-state concern. At any rate, Montana's 
economic development strategy problems are further 
compounded by the adversarial relationship between the 
Governor's Office and the State Legislature. 1991's 
version of the annual budget shortfall is expected to be 
$107 million. If past performance is any indicator, the 
deficit remedy will be in the form of another surtax on 
personal income.
The property tax remains the primary source of revenue 
for Montana's state and county budgets. The state's 
reliance on property taxes to pay for government services 
is the highest in the nation with 48 percent of the total 
state and local tax revenue coming from the property tax.
pThe national average is 30 percent. The introduction of 
a sales tax designed to proportionally reduce the personal 
property tax is biannually presented as the heart of a 
revamped tax system which would (supposedly) encourage 
economic development. However, it has been proven time 
and time again that the passage of such a tax is 
politically unrealistic in the foreseeable future. Given 
the inability for Montana's government to fashion a viable 
program of economic development, the state continues to be 
dependent upon national and international economic policy 
and developments, with little control over its own 
economic destiny. An obvious example is the oil and gas
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industry. In 1984, Montana collected $134 million in oil 
tax revenue. Unfortunately, by 1988 the "boom" was a 
"bust" and only $17 million was collected.^ Indeed, 
there are few areas in which Montana has demonstrated any 
capability of control over its own economic destiny. 
However, the tourism and mining are currently the two most 
rapidly expanding and promising industries.
2. The General Economic Condition of Valley 
County* As the economy of Montana counties and 
communities has generally suffered (with the exception of 
those few who have benefited due to the tourism and mining 
industries), so has that of Valley County. Valley 
County's economy is dependent upon the agriculture 
industry, i.e., farming, stock production and supporting 
businesses such as implement, seed and fertilizer dealers. 
This dependence on agriculture carries with it the 
vulnerabilities of that industry. The economy is 
vulnerable in that the federal government is an ever more 
dominant (and unreliable) factor in the "success" of the 
farm or ranch. Additionally, there is still "Mother 
Nature" to deal with in the form of drought, flood, 
windstorm and other natural disasters. Personal income in 
wages and salaries has dropped to $42,369,000.00 in 1986 
compared to $62,252,000.00 in 1 9 8 1 . Reflective of the 
very substantial economic recession in the county is the 
drop in population. In 1980, Valley County had 10,250
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residents, in 1988 the population was 8,400. The loss of 
1,900 people was the fourth largest population loss in the 
state and the -18.2 percent loss rate was second highest. 
Glasgow's loss of 1,040 people was the third largest 
statewide and the -2 3.4 percent loss rate was the highest 
of any city over 1,000 residents (third overall behind 
Plevna, -30.9 percent and Walkerville, -24.9 percent).
3. Montana National Guard Economic Impact.
a. MONTANA. Total federal expenditures on the 
Montana National Guard for fiscal year 1988 (October 1, 
1987 thru September 30, 1988) was $61,107,000.00. This 
figure is comprised of pay, local purchases for items such 
as food and fuel, operating expenses required to maintain 
the unit armories located throughout the state and 
expenses related to the reorganization of the Montana Army 
National Guard into the 163d AR BDE. Additionally, the 
State of Montana contributed $804,900.00 for operations 
and maintenance for a total of $61,911,900.00 (98.6 
percent of which is federal). Of particular interest is 
"wages, local purchases and contracting" ($45,723,700.00), 
which represents the monies that have the greatest impact 
on the individual communities in which Guard units are
located. Of the $45,723,700.00, $44,918,800.00 (98
1 9percent) are federal funds. Appendix D lists the said 
expenditures in each community where an MT ARNG unit is
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located (as of Sep, 30, 1988). These figures are based 
upon the $45,723,700.00 figure.
b. VALLEY COUNTY. As identified in Appendix D, 
Valley County and Glasgow specifically benefit from the 
presence of an Army National Guard unit. In fiscal year 
1988, the total federal and state expenditure was
$306,600.00, $295,600.00 (96.4 percent) of said total
13being federal funds.
4. Prospective Economic Impact of the Montana 
Training Center. The full economic impact of the 
activation of the Montana Training Center is impossible at 
this time to ascertain. Data solicited from the National 
Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA (which most closely 
represents the types of training activities to be con­
ducted at the MTC) indicates that a single brigade-sized 
Annual Training period generates approximately $1 million 
in payments to the training center location specifically 
and state generally.Plans call for the Montana Training 
Center to, upon full activation, rotate four brigade-sized 
elements through the training cycle per year. Addition­
ally, it is estimated that 150 to 200 people would be 
employed at the MTC if fully activated.
Under the current usage context whereby MT ARNG units 
train at the VCAE one to two weekends per month (as part 
of the aforementioned lease agreement between the VCAE and 
the Montana Army National Guard), approximately $13,000.00
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in direct payment to the community is generated for fuel 
and food. Additionally, approximately $10,000.00 is paid 
in wages for a total of $23,000.00. This infusion of 
federal funds is a conservative estimate for one unit 
consisting of 80-100 s o l d i e r s F o u r  soldiers have been 
hired full-time in support of the current training 
activities at the VCAE and planning activities for the 
proposed Montana Training Center. Two of the soldiers, 
with a combined annual payroll of $41,688.00, live in 
Valley County. The other two, with a combined annual 
payroll of $62,018.00, live in Helena.
As illustrated earlier in the general assessments of the 
state's and Valley County's economic status, each unit's 
home location and the state generally benefits from the 
presence of the National Guard. Unfortunately, a 
significant amount of funds is still lost to the state. 
Approximately $2 million per year is spent training 
soldiers and airmen outside the state while at Annual 
Training.These training and equipment maintenance 
monies would be kept in-state if the Montana Training 
Center were developed.
5. Possible Negative Economic Impact to Valley 
County. Just as the positive economic impacts cannot be 
assessed at this time, neither can the negative. Listed 
are the areas most visibly vulnerable to the development
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of the Montana Training Center.
a. Of the approximate 701 ranch and farm 
operations in Valley County, 110 of them, holding 86 
federal, state and county grazing leases, have operations 
on land in the proposed training area. The ranches are 
cow-calf and yearling operations, and the farms are
dry-land grains and fodder. The majority of the ranches 
and farms are family-owned with a few of the operations 
having more than one family associated with the operation 
(the 110 ranches involve 130 families). Livestock sales 
and cash crops are the primary source of income in the 
a r e a . A  very significant factor is that great value is 
placed on the Bureau of Land Management and State Lands 
leases a farmer/rancher may possess. In fact, the value 
of the holdings is linked directly to that leased land.
If that land is lost to the farmer/rancher, there may be a 
potentially serious, negative economic impact.
b. Hunting is the primary recreational activity 
in the area that generates revenue other than ranching and 
farming. It is estimated that hunting expenditures for 
travel, food, lodging and fees (variable expenditures) 
average $41.00 per day for resident and nonresident 
hunters (1988 Net Economic Value of Hunting in Montana, 
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks). Based on 
6,818 hunter days annually in the training area, hunting 
deer and antelope generates about $257,424.00 annually in
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direct expenditures to the local economy (i.e., sporting 
goods stores, motels, service stations, etc.)
c. 105,100 acres belong to the Montana 
Department of State Lands. This acreage produces about 
$80,000.00 for the state schools, specifically those in 
Valley County.
6. Summary. The economic problems Montana endure 
are deeply entrenched and unlikely to be resolved in the 
forseeable future. The state, counties and cities seek to 
widen their respective tax bases to more adequately fund 
public services, however, to do so requires more business/ 
industrial activity. If said activity develops, more jobs 
are available and as the population increases to fill 
those positions, the tax base is strengthened.
Statistics show that Valley County and the City of 
Glasgow have been particularly hard hit by Montana's 
recession. Additionally, the two industries that show the 
greatest promise currently for the state, mining and 
tourism, are not likely to benefit either the county or 
city. Of low profile is the significant statewide 
economic impact of the Montana National Guard. Projected 
usage by Montana Guard resources and prospective 
utilization by out-of-state entities coupled with existing 
economic impact data from comparable training sites 
present a potential economic impact which Valley County
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and Montana cannot ignore or trivialize.
The proposed EIS to be prepared by the BLM or another 
mutually acceptable contracted entity would include an 
in-depth and comprehensive economic impact analysis. 
Preliminary economic indicators would seemingly support 
the development of the Montana Training Center.
CHAPTER SIX
THE MEED
The actual need for the Montana Training Center is a 
controversal issue which is amplified given the enormous 
size, prospective training activities, perceived multiple- 
use conflicts and the proposed withdrawal of 5,000 acres 
of public lands. Given the generally acknowledged 
lessening of worldwide tensions, the argument of whether 
or not the training center fulfills a valid military need 
is fundamental to the case made by both the opponents and 
proponents of the Montana Training Center. Addressed 
below, in the context of military need, are identified 
"pros" and "cons" of the development.
1. It is NOT Needed.
a. The economy of the United States has become 
increasingly dependent upon military spending. In 1978, 
defense oriented industries employed 5,839,000 persons. 
When this figure is combined with civilian and military 
personnel directly hired by the Department of Defense and 
defense related government agencies, the combined 
employment supporting the defense system for 1978 was 
8,942,000, or 10.5 percent of all employment, both public
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and private, in the United States! Of course, this 
does not take into account the unprecedented defense 
spending buildup during the Reagan years. The main point 
is that an economy based upon defense spending is not ‘ 
good economics and, in fact, may be one of the primary 
causes of the budget deficit.
b. In response to increasing Congressional 
pressure to reduce Department of Defense expenditures, the 
Secretary of Defense has proposed an initial cut of $2 0 
billion for fiscal year 1991 with an additional $180 
billion in cuts programmed for the years 1992-1994. 
Accompanying the cuts, the Army plans to cut 200,000 
personnel (civilian, reserve and active duty) from its
oiforce structure.
c. The world is witnessing history in Eastern 
Europe. The collapse of the Communist governments 
throughout the region is as breathtaking in its rapidity 
as it is stunning in its potential economic and political 
impacts. These in turn will impact the Warsaw Pact. This 
military organization of Eastern European Communist 
countries was formed to counterbalance the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet Union has always 
been the dominate member of the Warsaw Pact, overseeing 
and exercising ultimate command over the military 
organizations of each member nation. This was directly 
attributable to the Soviet Union's authority over each
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nation's Communist governments. This authority has been 
dramatically eroded by the continuing movement towards and 
formation of non-communist governments. Two factors play 
heavily into the expected deterioration of the Warsaw 
Pact:
(1) The governments of the countries are 
mandated by the people to improve each respective nation's 
economies. The limited resources will be, in varying 
degrees, reallocated from the military to economic 
development programs.
(2) The reallocation of national resources 
from the military will be more probable because the 
governments are now more accountable and answerable to the 
populace rather than to the Soviet Union.
The erosion of the Warsaw Pact, with respect to 
solidarity and resource commitment, can be viewed as a 
reduction in tensions and the probability of conflict 
between it and NATO. NATO member nations will respond in 
kind. It is even possible that the Warsaw Pact could 
dissolve. If this were to happen, NATO conceiveably would 
follow suit. Such a development may even be the result of 
negotiations between the two organizations.
d. Prior to the landmark political changes in 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and United States had 
already agreed upon and implemented military reductions in
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equipment and personnel in Europe. Significant quantities 
of U.S. military forces based in Europe are in the process 
of reassignment back to the mainland. Additional troop 
reductions have been proposed by President Bush.
e. Training areas existing in both Montana and 
out-of-state locations have been utilized for years and 
have provided satisfactory training. It is not necessary 
to build another one.
f. Given the facts that the Department of 
Defense is cutting its budget, Montana has no visible 
funding available to finance a training site and peace is 
"breaking out all over" in Europe, it is simply not 
appropriate to burden the taxpayer with building the 
largest training site of its type in the nation.
These considerations, separately and in total, present 
just cause to critically question the military need for 
developing the Montana Training Center.
2. It IS Needed.
a. There exists in the United States a very 
limited quantity of training centers where large-scale 
combined arms training integrated with ground and air 
gunnery ranges exist: the National Training Center at Ft.
Irwin and Camp Pendleton, California, Ft. Bliss and Ft. 
Hood, Texas, Yakima Firing Center, Washington, Ft. Carson, 
Colorado and Gowen Field, Idaho. All listed, with the 
exception of Gowen Field, are federal installations which
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predominately train Active Component u n i t s . T h e y  are all 
very heavily utilized and are incapable of programming 
additional training time in that they are used year-round 
at their full potential. The reassignment of U.S. Army 
units from overseas to the U.S. only intensifies the 
current limitations present in training sites at both the 
national and state levels. The units reassigned must 
still train and since all will have returned from NATO 
combat elements, it follows that many will be tank and 
artillery units which require maneuver and gunnery ranges 
on which to train (as opposed to Military Police, 
Intelligence and communications units which do not require 
such areas to maintain and/or enhance their operational 
readiness). This presents two options. One is that new 
areas must be developed to meet this need. The second, 
assuming that no new areas can be developed, is that the 
existing training sites schedule units in for training on 
a less frequent basis or for a shorter period of time to 
accommodate the additional unit load. This situation 
would have a negative impact on the operational readiness 
of the affected military forces. The same considerations 
exist for Air Force units which are reassigned back to the 
United States. The expected Pentagon recommendation to 
close twenty-four military bases located in the U.S. 
further necessitates additional training areas since those
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assets at the closed bases will have been lost.
b. While the currently programmed and 
prospective troop reductions, troop stationing 
realignments and base closures negatively impact the 
availability of training areas, they also pose logistical 
problems for the equipment and supplies organic to each 
organization. Although an armor division, for instance, 
may be deactivated, the tanks, armored personnel carriers, 
rifles, food service equipment and communications equip­
ment will not disappear as the manpower might. There will 
be the need for storage, security and maintenance of very 
large quantities of equipment and supplies. There is in 
excess of 1 million square feet of unused warehouse space 
(all of which can be heated) at the abandaned Glasgow Air 
Force Base which could be made available, exclusive of the 
storage needs of the Montana National Guard.
c. Low-altitude NATO forces flight training in 
Europe is increasingly controversial, unpopular, dangerous 
and unavailable. The relatively small land mass and large 
population does not avail itself to the type of training 
the air forces need, i.e., air-to-ground and air-to-air 
weapons training and low-altitude flying skills enhance­
ment. This impacts all NATO nations and has resulted in 
increasing quantities of NATO aircraft training at ranges 
in the United States and Canada.
d. The "hub center" concept airlines use in the
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U.S. has significantly impacted Air Force jet and Army 
helicopter flight training. Many of the military bases 
are located near major cities which are "hubs" for air 
travel. A hub's air traffic congestion is continuous and 
covers an extremely large air space, thus requiring that 
the training be conducted a long distances from the base.
The aforementioned considerations reflect national and 
even international training needs supportive of developing 
additional training sites with capabilities comparable to 
that of the Montana Training Center. A more immediate 
consideration, however, is the needs of the Montana 
National Guard. Both the Montana Army and Air Guards must 
conduct the great majority and the most significant (in 
terms of tactics and weapons) of their training out-of- 
state. This presents three militarily negative impacts:
a. The time required to proceed to and return 
from the designated training site detracts from the 
quantity of training which can be conducted.
b. The limited capabilities of the assigned 
training sites detract from the quality of the training 
which is conducted (i.e., the 163d AR BDE cannot train as 
one organizational structure even though, if Federalized, 
it would be deployed as one).
c. The limitations on the quantity and quality 
of current training site resources have a negative impact
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on the unit's combat readiness, capability for mission 
accomplishment and ultimate survivabilitv of the soldiers
CHAPTER SEVEN
RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding sections have been presented for the 
purposes of identifying a major shortcoming in the Montana 
National Guard's training program, the proposed solution 
to that shortfall (development of the Montana Training 
Center) and the key areas of consideration and 
controversy. Each key area has, to the most attainable 
extent, been illustrated, delineated and/or investigated 
to present as complete a view as possible. The ultimate 
purpose and expression of this presentation is to conduct 
a preliminary study of the feasibility of developing the 
Montana Training Center and, ultimately, to state any 
recommendations that are derived from this process.
Researching the "hard" data, attending the BLM public 
meeting in Helena, visiting with various interested and 
effected individuals, and touring the land where the 
Montana Training Center would be located have led to 
certain findings. These are described below with each 
followed by an appropriate recommendation:
1. The single most persuasive concept to most 
people is the economic impact of the proposed development
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and current Montana National Guard operations statewide. 
Both the present operations and the potential of the 
Montana Training Center represent significant infusion of 
primarily federal monies into the state and county.
Recommendation: The Montana National Guard must invest
in an updated, comprehensive economic impact analysis of 
Guard operations statewide and prepare as detailed an 
analysis as possible of the prospective economic impacts 
of the Montana Training Center, both in strictly Montana 
National Guard utilization and fullv developed contexts. 
Upon completion, the analysis should be distributed 
statewide to the general populance and to specific 
organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs 
and VFWs.
2. The mandated reductions of U.S. Army military 
personnel because of defense budget and perceived military 
threat considerations, in reality, adds to the nation's 
dependence on the Reserve Component (RC), i.e., Army 
National Guard and Army Reserve, and RC training assets. 
The United States military strength depends on what is 
termed the Total Force. No longer is the Active Component 
solely responsible for combat readiness and duty. It is 
much less expensive to the American taxpayer to upgrade 
the Reserve Component in authorized quantity of personnel, 
training opportunity and equipment than it is to do the 
equivalent to the Active Component. Therefore, there are
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developments such as Montana's reorganization into an 
armored brigade which requires more units, more soldiers, 
more expensive equipment (Ml tanks, latest editions of 
armored personnel carriers, etc.)/ more full-time support 
personnel and more money for training soldiers in the 
resultant additional military occupational specialties.
It is a fact that the U.S. could not engage in an extended 
or intensive conflict without activating Reserve Component 
units. Appendix E provides examples of the relationship 
between the Army's Active and Reserve Components. 3̂ with 
reductions in the Active Component, the Reserve Component 
assumes a greater role in the nation's defense. With that 
increased dependence comes the increasingly more urgent 
needs of operational readiness, i.e., training.
Recommendation: The Montana citizenry must be educated
as to the impacts that overseas troop reassignment and 
in-country base closures actually have on training site 
resources. Additionally, the vital and integrated role 
that the Montana National Guard plays in national defense 
should be presented. I further recommend that the 
presentation be part of the updated economic impact 
analysis refered to in "b.".
3. The great majority of the land on which the 
Montana Training Center would be located is, at best, 
marginal for agricultural interests. It is land that is
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generally so bare that ranchers need 80 acres to sustain 
one cow for six months. A land that is so generally 
devoid of human environmental comforts that the entire 
southern section, 4 08,706 acres, is uninhabited by man.
The National Wildlife Federation and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council have determined that 42 percent of the 
more than 39 million acres of BLM rangeland is in poor 
condition, suffering from overgrazing, mismanagement and 
underfunding.
Recommendation: The status of Montana BLM rangeland,
specifically that which is in Valley County, should be 
determined. This would be accomplished by researching 
BLM, National Wildlife Federation and Natural Resources 
Defense Council studies and data. Objectives would be to 
find out if current rangeland usage is the most 
appropriate and beneficial for the land, provides the best 
return on the dollar for the taxpayer and is utilized in 
the best interests of the common good.
4. A little considered potential economic impact is 
in regards to Native Americans living in the northeast 
sector of the state whose unemployment rates commonly run 
as high as 7 0 percent. A tribal-backed group in Wolf 
Point, the Wolf Point Community Organization recently 
purchased and moved to Wolf Point the Great Divide 
Manufacturing Company of Helena which manufactures 
military silhouettes for target practice.
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Recommendation: The potential economic impact and
opportunities the development of the Montana Training 
Center could have on Native Americans should be studied as 
part of a larger study which would identify potential 
defense-related industries which may be attracted to the 
VCAE complex. This study would be based such factors as 
facilities available, environmental assets (clean air, 
small population), potential workforce and legislatively 
mandated inducements designed to attract the businesses or 
facilitate development by in^state investors.
5. The expense of an Environmental Impact Study is 
prohibitive if sole reliance is on state resources, be the 
price-tag $250,000.00 or $7,000,000.00.
Recommendation: If the arguments of significant
positive impact for national defense are valid, financial 
support from the Department of Defense should be 
available. Montana's U.S. Senators and Representatives 
must be lobbied for their active support and persistant 
efforts to obtain the needed funding for the EIS.
6. Glasgow Air Force Base was built in 1959 for 
$110 million and was designed for 3,500 military and an 
additional 5,000 family members. Within twenty years the 
base was closed down due to treaty negotiations (as 
opposed to ratifications  ̂ between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The structural resources are
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astounding. Cases in point include storage capabilities 
of over 1 million square feet, housing quarters complete 
with furniture, appliances, even dishes, and a runway 
which at over 13,000 feet in length is the third longest 
in the nation and is the fourth alternative for landing 
the space shuttle. All the structures and facilities are 
in exceptional shape because of a $4 million grant the Air 
Force gave Valley County when the base was deeded over. 
These funds were specifically for maintenance and
development of the base, but are expected to be completely
25expended this fiscal year.
Recommendation: The taxpayer investment into Glasgow
Air Force Base is large and the intent of using the 
facility for military purposes is unquestioned. Because 
maintenance monies are expended, it is critical that the 
facilities and structures be used immediately or 
deterioration will rapidly take its toll and the complex 
will be rendered, in large part, unusable. The former air 
base was constructed for the military and its optimum 
usage is by the military. Given demonstrable need, the 
base should be available for training/administrative 
activities of the Montana National Guard.
7. The existence of the 5,000 acre artillery range 
has the greatest potential to "derail" the land lease 
agreement with the BLM. The Engle Act requires that any 
proposal to withdraw 5,000 or more acres of public land
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from public use must be reviewed by the Federal Lands and 
Parks Subcommittee in the House of Representatives. 
Administrative review by this subcommittee would 
essentially "kill" the proposal since it is Chaired by 
Representative Vento of Wisconsin. The Congressman has 
publically denounced the efforts of the military to create 
or enlarge training areas in the United States.
Recommendation: The Montana National Guard must be
prepared to terminate the proposed withdrawal of the high- 
explosive impact area and use it as the other ranges are 
envisioned and planned, for nonexplosive munitions.
8. The most controversal issue of the proposed 
development is the expected damage to the land resulting 
from tracked vehicle training maneuvers. Though a 
comprehensive reclamation study program is underway (as 
identified in page 41) and the latest of environmental 
management technologies is utilized in all stages of 
development, there is still (understandably) great public 
concern and skepticism as to the National Guard's ability 
to fulfill its environmental responsibilities.
Recommendation: It is essential that, to the greatest
extent possible, public participation in all areas of 
environmental concern be maximized. The primary benefits 
of this would be two-fold. First, the National Guard can 
benefit from the input of those citizens who have first­
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hand knowledge and experience with the land impacted by 
"Guard" training. This should result in more efficient, 
practical and reasonable land usage and reclamation 
programs. Secondly, the general populace will perceive 
that the Montana "Guard" is responsive to public concerns 
and input and is, indeed, making a good faith attempt at 
being a "good neighbor". This should result in greater 
cooperation and good will between the "Guard" and public. 
Additionally, as public recommendations are incorporated 
into the planning and training processes, the public will 
gain "ownership" in said processes. This facilitates 
support and trust in the Montana National Guard.
In summation, this study concludes that development of 
the Montana Training Center at the (former) Glasgow Air 
Force Base appears feasible and desirable in light of 
Montana National Guard training needs. However, as 
identified by each specific recommendation, additional 
study and/or project development is required in specific 
areas.
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APPENDIX A (cont.)
MONTANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS
LOCATION
PERSONNEL 
AS6D AUTH
ANNUAL 
TRNG LOG
MOB
STATION
HQ STARC HELENA 271 231 YEAR-RD HELENA
DET 1 HQ STARC HELENA 27 29 YEAR-RD HELENA
DET 2 HQ STARC HELENA 5 5 YEAR-RD HELENA
1030 PAD HELENA 17 13 VARIES FT LEWIS, 
WA
1049TH ENGR PLT HELENA 20 22 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD 
ID
210TH PER SVC CO HELENA 39 57 YEAR-RD UNDETERMD
HQ & SVC AHB CO 
1-189TH AVN
HELENA 167 166 VARIES FT LEWIS, 
WA
CO A AHC HELENA 39 37 VARIES FT LEWIS
CO B AHC HELENA 39 37 VARIES FT LEWIS
CO C AHC HELENA 33 37 VARIES FT LEWIS
163D AR BDE UNITS
HHC(-) 163D AR BDE BOZEMAN 195 190 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 1 HHC LIVINGSTON 69 69 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 2 HHC HARLOWTON 48 60 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
1063D(-) ENGR CO MISSOULA 82 70 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 1 1063D GR. FALLS 79 122 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
TRP E(-) 163D CAV MALTA 68 65 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 1 TRP E GLASGOW 85 72 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
1-163D CAV BN
HHC(-) 1-163D CAV BUTTE 131 131 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 1 HHC DEER LODGE 33 51 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 2 HHC ANACONDA 41 52 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO A 1-163D CAV DILLON 73 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO B 1-163D CAV HAMILTON 59 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO C 1-163D CAV HELENA 57 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO D 1-163D CAV GR. FALLS 54 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
2-163D CAV BN
HHC(-) 2-163D CAV KALISPELL 109 131 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 1 HHC LIBBY 47 51 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
DET 2 HHC WHITEFISH 38 52 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
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APPENDIX A (cont.) 
PERSONNEL163D AR BDE UNITS LOCATION A8GD AÜTH ANNUAL MOBTRNG LOG STATION
2-163D CAV BN (cont.)
CO A 2-163D CAV KALISPELL 58 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO B 2-163D CAV MISSOULA 56 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO C 2-163D CAV MISSOULA 54 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
CO D 2-163D CAV SHELBY 44 76 GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
1-163D IN BN
HHC 1-163D IN BILLINGS 165 243 FT CARSON 
CO
GOWEN FLD
CO A 1-163D IN BILLINGS 64 110 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
CO B(-) 1-163D IN GLENDIVE 47 50 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
DET 1 CO B SIDNEY 33 60 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
CO C(-) 1-163D IN CULBERTSON 42 50 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
DET 1 CO C PLENTYWOOD 41 60 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
CO D(-) 1-163D IN LEWISTOWN 46 50 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
DET 1 CO D CHINOOK 49 60 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
CO E(AT) 1-163D IN MILES CITY 52 73 FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
495TH SPT BN
HHC 495TH SPT HAVRE 157 154 VARIES GOWEN FLD
CO A(-) S&T 495TH MISSOULA 64 77 VARIES GOWEN FLD
DET 1 CO A BILLINGS 54 76 VARIES GOWEN FLD
CO B MAINT 495TH HELENA 171 276 VARIES GOWEN FLD
CO C(MED) 495TH BILLINGS 65 110 VARIES GOWEN FLD
163D AR BDE UNITS TOTAL 2555 3173
OTHER UNITS TOTAL 
PERSONNEL TOTALS
657 640
3212 3813
NOTE: TWO ADDITIONAL 163D AR BDE UNITS ARE LOCATED IN
WYOMING: DET 1 CO B 495TH SPT BN & 3-49TH FA BN
BECAUSE THEY ARE IN WYOMING, THEY ARE PART OF THE WYOMING 
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD 
MOBILIZE WITH THE MT ARNG.
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APPENDIX B
1630 AR BDE UNITS
UNITS LOCATION
DISTANCE (MILEAGE) TO: 
GOWEN FIELD MTC OP CENTER
HHC(-) 1630 AR BDE 
DET 1 HHC 
DET 2 HHC
BOZEMAN
LIVINGSTON
HARLOWTON
525
551
621
384
358
279
1063DC-) ENGR CO 
DET 1 1063D
MISSOULA 
GREAT FALLS
350
596
458
290
TRP E(-) 163D CAV MALTA
DET 1 TRP E GLASGOW
797
867
89
19
1-163D CAV BN UNITS
HHC(-) 1-163D CAV
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC
CO A 1-163D CAV
CO B 1-163D CAV
CO C 1-163D CAV
CO D 1-163D CAV
BUTTE
DEER LODGE
ANACONDA
DILLON
HAMILTON
HELENA
GREAT FALLS
443
467
451
378
375
507
596
443
436
462
487
505
379
290
2-163D CAV BN UNITS
HHC(-) 2-163D CAV
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC
CO A 2-163D CAV
CO B 2-163D CAV
CO C 2-163D CAV
CO D 2-163D CAV
KALISPELL
LIBBY
WHITEFISH
KALISPELL
MISSOULA
MISSOULA
SHELBY
465
540
479
465
350
350
673
438
527
432
438
458
458
279
1-163D IN BN UNITS
HHC 1-163D IN 
CO A 1-163D IN 
CO B(-) 1-163D IN 
DET 1 CO B 
CO C(-) 1-163D IN 
DET 1 CO C 
CO D(-) 1-163D IN 
DET 1 CO D 
CO E(AT) 1-163D IN
495TH SPT BN UNITS
HHC 495TH SPT 
CO A(-) S&T SPT 
DET 1 CO A 
CO B(-) MAINT SPT 
CO C(MED) SPT
BILLINGS
BILLINGS
GLENDIVE
SIDNEY
CULBERTSON
PLENTYWOOD
LEWISTOWN
CHINOOK
MILES CITY
HAVRE
MISSOULA
BILLINGS
HELENA
BILLINGS
666
666
888
937
970
1012
678
730
811
709
350
666
507
666
298
298
170
159
122
164
222
156
216
177
458
298
379
298
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APPENDIX C
MONTANA TRAINING CENTER ACREAGE OWNERSHIP/CONFIGURATION
TACTICAL MANEUVER AREA (Northern Sector)
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT   354,640 ACRES (62%)
PRIVATE   132,340 ACRES (23%)
S T A T E ...................... 78,880 ACRES (14%)
VALLEY COUNTY AIRPORT ENTERPRISE. . 6,800 ACRES (<1%)
TOTAL: 572.660 ACRES
FIRE AND MANEUVER AREA (Southern Sector)
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT   363,676 ACRES (89%)
PRIVATE ...........................  18,810 ACRES (4.6%)
STATE .............................  26,200 ACRES (6.4%)
TOTAL: 408.706 ACRES
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SECTOR TOTALS
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT   718,316 ACRES (73.7%)
PRIVATE ...........................  151,150 ACRES (15.5%)
STATE .............................  105,100 ACRES (10.7%)
VALLEY COUNTY AIRPORT ENTERPRISE. . 6,800 ACRES (<.01%)
TOTAL: 981.366 ACRES
MAP COLOR KEY (APPENDIX C cont.)
YELLOW - ELM
PINK - OTHER FEDERAL LANDS (LAND UTILIZATION LANDS)
BLUE - STATE LANDS 
WHITE - PRIVATE
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APPENDIX D
MONTANA NATIONAL GUARD EXPENDITURES BY COMMUNITY
(As of September 30, 1988)
CITY PAYROLL OPERATINGEXPENSES TOTAL
ANACONDA $ 180 900 $ 32 200 $ 213 100BILLINGS 1,499 200 168 200 1,667 400BOZEMAN 1/ 109 800 121 600 1,231 400BUTTE 640 800 46 500 687 300CHINOOK 353 500 32 500 386 000CULBERTSON 337 600 43 400 381 000DEER LODGE 181 300 26 000 207 300DILLON 268 800 35 900 304 700GREAT FALLS 21, 114 600 336 200 21,450 800GLASGOW 269 600 37 000 306 600GLENDIVE 208 600 35 300 243 900HAMILTON 255 900 37 400 293 300HARLOWTON 132 200 26 800 159 000HAVRE 986 300 74 900 1,061 200HELENA 11, 763 400 749 600 12,513 000KALISPELL 992 700 111 100 1,103 800LEWISTOWN 301 400 42 200 343 600LIBBY 201 600 29 400 231 000LIVINGSTON 190 500 30 800 221 300MALTA 279 500 41 600 321 100MILES CITY 275 500 46 400 321 900MISSOULA 1, 045 300 154 600 1,199 900PLENTYWOOD 209 600 28 500 238 100SHELBY 183 100 33 700 216 800SIDNEY 199 500 27 300 226 800WHITEFISH 169 200 24 200 193 400
TOTALS $43, 350, 400 S2.373 ,300 S45.723 ,700
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APPENDIX E
CONTRIBUTIONS OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS
TO THE TOTAL ARMY
(As of Sept. 30, 1988)
UNIT TYPES
% OF TOTAL 
ARMY: ARMY NAT'L GUARD
% OF TOTAL 
ARMY: ARMY 
RESERVE
MT ARNG UNITS
INFANTRY SCOUT TROOPS 100
TOW LIGHT ANTI-TANK 100
INFANTRY BATTALIONS
HEAVY HELICOPTER UNITS 100
PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNITS 58
HEAVY EQUIPMENT 76
MAINTENANCE COMPANIES
SEPARATE BRIGADES 73
ENGINEER BATTALIONS 52
(COMBAT)
HOSPITAL UNITS 8
ENGINEER BRIDGE COMPANY 43
TRUCK COMPANIES 37
MILITARY POLICE COMPANIES 44
FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS 52
SIGNAL (COMMUNICATION) 43
BATTALIONS
INFANTRY BATTALIONS 50
SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS 25
ARMORED BATTALIONS 43
29 
10
7
25
69
31
30 
21
9
14
5
25
2
(in Wyoming)
7 7
GLOSSARY
ACTIVATION: By issuance of an official order, a soldier
is placed on active duty.
ACTIVE COMPONENT: Comprised of all branches of the Armed
Forces who are on active duty, i.e., full-time.
ASSIGNED TROOP STRENGTH: The actual quantity of soldiers
who are in a unit.
AUTHORIZED TROOP STRENGTH: The quantity of soldiers
identified by National Guard Bureau as appropriate for 
a unit.
COLUMN FORMATION: Vehicles or personnel arranged one
after the other, a row.
COMBINED ARMS: The incorporation and integration of
various military resources during tactical operations.
DEPLOYMENT: The relocation of troops to overseas areas
of operations.
EMBARKATION: The loading of troops, supplies and equip­
ment onto ships or aircraft for deployment to overseas 
locations.
FEDERALIZATION, FEDERALIZED: The transfer of Reserve
Component units from reserve status to active duty 
status. This action is accomplished by issuance of 
an official order.
FIELD ENVIRONMENT: An area for military operations or
maneuvers.
FORCE STRUCTURE: The organization of military units and
their relationship to each other.
LOGISTICS, LOGISTICAL: The procedures and actions of
procurement, maintenance and transportation of mili­
tary material, facilities and personnel.
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: The job, skill or
"slot” in the military a soldier possesses.
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GLOSSARY (cont.)
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU: The division of the Department
of Defense responsible for overall management of 
United States National Guard functions. Federal 
funds and Department of Defense policy are channeled 
through National Guard Bureau eventually to the state 
level. However, National Guard Bureau is not in the 
chain-of-command of National Guard organizations.
RESERVE COMPONENT: Comprised of National Guard and
Reserve units of all branches of the Armed Forces, 
i.e.. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
SCENARIO: An account or synopsis of a projected course
of action or events.
STRENGTH: The number of soldiers assigned to a unit.
TACTICS/ TACTICAL: Relating to combat operations. The
process of disposing and maneuvering forces in combat 
or simulated combat).
TOTAL FORCE: The combination and utilization of Active
and Reserve Component units in planning, policy and 
execution.
WAR PLANS: Those plans made at the highest levels of the
Department of Defense which address specific threats to 
national security and identify the military response. 
The response, among other things, identifies specific 
Active and Reserve Component units which will respond. 
War plans carry security classifications of SECRET and 
TOP SECRET.
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FOOTNOTES
^U.S., Department of the Army, Training Site General 
Information. National Guard Bureau Pamphlet 25-1 
(5 February 1988), p.p. 1-1 thru 6-98.
^Ibid.
^Montana, Montana Training Center (MTC) Site 
Development Plan (20 November 1989), p. 1-5.
4U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land 
Management, Executive Correspondence. 1616.041 (1 December 
1989).
^University of Montana Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research, "Growth Expected for Montana's 
Economy," Montana Business Ouarterlv 27 (Autumn 1989):19.
^Montana Taxpayer Association, "Attracting New, 
Keeping Old Business Hinges on Adjusting our Tax Policy," 
Montana Taxpaver XXIII (November 1989):1-4.
^"Montana's Cupboard is Bare", Ibid. p.2.
®"Attracting New, Keeping Old Business Hinges on 
Adjusting our Tax Policy", op. cit., p.1.
^Ibid., p.2.
Montana, Montana Countv Profiles Suppliment to the 
Fifth Edition - Valiev Countv (May 1989), sec. 06.
^^U.5., Bureau of Census, Local Population Estimates 
f1988 PopulationK (1990).
Montana, The Impact of the Montana National Guard 
(29 December 1988), p.p. 14-43.
Ibid. p.25.
Interview with Captain Dinan, Budget Officer at the 
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Californea, 16 
January 1990.
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FOOTNOTES (cont.)
Interview with Captain Russell, Project Officer for 
the Montana Training Center, Helena, Montana, 24 January 
1990.
Interview with Sergeant First Class Wing, Pay 
Examinations Supervisor - United States Property and 
Fiscal Office, Fort Harrison, Montana, 25 January 1990.
17Montana, Montana Training Center fMTCl Site 
Development Plan (20 November 1989), encl. 6-5.
Ibid., encl. 6-6.
Ibid., "Footnotes".
20 Robert D. Lee, Jr. and Ronald W. Johnson, Public 
Budgeting Systems 3d ed. (Baltimore: University Park 
Press, 1984), p.p. 25-26.
21 "Army Plans to cut 2 00,000 Personnel," Helena 
Independent Record. 21 November 1989, sec. A, p. 8.
^^U.S., Department of the Army, Training Site General 
Information. National Guard Bureau Pamphlet 25-1 
(5 February 1988), p.p. 1-1 thru 6-98.
^^"Contributions by Army Reserve Components to the 
Total Army", Defense *89 Almanic (Sep/Oct 1989):16-17.
"Study: Nevada's Rangelands are Dying," Reno 
Gazette-Journal. 16 November 1989, sec. B, p.p. 1-2.
^^CPT Russell, op. cit.
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